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Panel: The Future of
Democracy Promotion
After Iraq
Introductionprovided by Professor Greg Fox *

Democracy promotion became a big business in the 1990s. Following the end
of the Cold War, there was a surge of optimism in the West about the possibility of
spreading democracy to areas where it had not flourished before.' This rather
unified sense of purpose appeared to leave behind Cold War-era debates about
whether Western advocates of democracy, and in particular the United States, were
simply promoting their anti-Communist geo-strategic interests in more acceptable
terms. And indeed, democracy promotion missions, particularly though not
exclusively of the United Nations, expanded rapidly in the 1990s. 2 The SecretaryGeneral and others accordingly pronounced democracy a universal value that
would enhance the well-being of persons in every region of the world.3
But the slow-motion train wreck we are now witnessing in Iraq has resurrected
many of the objections one heard in the early days of that debate. Some observers
dispute the wisdom, morality and motivation of outsiders seeking to implant
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Greg Fox is a professor of law at Wayne State University. He specializes in international
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law. Professor Fox is the recipient of a MacArthur Foundation/Social Science Research
Council Fellowship in International Peace and Security. That fellowship allowed him to
write The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 539
(1992), which is one of the ten most cited articles ever published in the Yale Journal. Much
of Professor Fox's subsequent scholarship focuses on how the world-wide spread of
democracy has affected the international legal system. He is the editor (with Brad Roth) of
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge 2000) and has
published on democratic institutions in post-conflict states and the role of the UN Security
Council in promoting democracy.
See Report of the Secretary-General,An Agenda for Democratization, UN Doc. A/5 1/761

(1996).
2.
3.

See ERIC C. BJORNLUND, BEYOND FREE AND FAIR: MONITORING ELECTIONS AND
BUILDING DEMOCRACY 43 (2004).
See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, 148,
delivered to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (2005) ("The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly in 1948, enunciated the
essentials of democracy. Ever since its adoption, it has inspired constitution-making in
every comer of the world, and it has contributed greatly to the eventual global acceptance of
democracy as a universal value.") (citation omitted).
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democratic institutions in other countries.4 Political change, it is said, must begin
5
locally and cannot be artificially enhanced or indeed initiated by foreigners.
Thomas Carothers has offered a related critique in a recent article entitled "The
Backlash against Democracy Promotion.",6 Carothers focuses on countries like
Russia, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea, where there seems
to be a pushback against outside efforts to supervise free and fair elections and
other reforms that are now part and parcel of the democracy promotion package.
Carothers argues that a common thread in these cases is the view of the United
States as a shadowy force, working behind the scenes to aid pro-democratic
movements.7 Because of Iraq and other focal points of anti-Americanism,
8
Carothers adds, these quasi-conspiracy theories have found fertile soil.
Carothers does acknowledge that backlash by these regimes may simply be the
result of democracy promotion in fact succeeding, thus posing a greater threat to
autocrats around the world. But this factor is secondary to the damage wrought by
the rhetoric and policies of the Bush Administration. The positive associations that
used to accompany US democracy policies have been undermined in the eyes of
much of the world. In Carothers' view, "Washington's use of the term 'democracy
promotion' has come to be seen overseas not as the expression of a principled
American aspiration but as a code word for 'regime change' - namely, the
replacement of bothersome governments by military force or other means." 9 The
Administration thus finds itself in the difficult position of creating more backlashes
against democracy promotion the more it protests the sincerity of its efforts.
Our panelists will ask whether the broad or narrow version of this critique - or
indeed some other version - is in fact accurate. Did the 1990s teach negative
lessons about the limits of external democracy promotion? Or is the current
backlash simply a reaction to specific policies that have few broader policy
implications?
I would like to make a second introductory point, motivated by something you
4.

5.

6.
7.

See generally Jennifer Windsor, Advancing the Freedom Agenda: Time for a
Recalibration?, 29 WASH. Q. 21 (2006); Steven R. Weisman, Democracy Push by Bush
Attracts Doubters in Party,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at Al; William I. Robinson, What to
Expect from US "Democracy Promotion" in Iraq, 26 NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE 441 (2004).
See Richard N. Haass, Freedom Is Not a Doctrine; Promoting Democracy Is the Wrong
Priority for Foreign Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2005, at A15; See generally Eric J.
Hobsbawm, Spreading Democracy, FOR. POL., September/October 2004.
See generally Thomas Carothers, The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion, 85 FOR.
AFF. 55 (2006).
Id. at 59.

8. Id. at64.
9. Id.
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may have noticed about our panel: although this is a conference about international
law, three of our four speakers are political scientists. Not to worry: the issue of
democracy promotion is of great interest to international lawyers, as evidence in
the broad and deep practice of international organizations and other legal actors.' °
There is, simply stated, now a great deal of law on what Thomas Franck has called
the "democratic entitlement."'" Let me describe three areas in which democratic
norms have flourished. First, all major human rights treaties guarantee a fight to
political participation, most of them building on Article 21 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.' 2 Second, many international organizations, most
prominently the United Nations but also the European Union, the OAS, the
Commonwealth and others have taken up democracy promotion as one of their
central goals and have dedicated substantial resources to election monitoring and a
whole variety of other activities. 13
Third, in building an institutional infrastructure around democracy promotion,
these and other international organizations have developed an innovative
enforcement mechanism: refusing membership or full membership rights to nondemocratic states. The European Union requires states to be democratic as a
precondition to membership.' 4 Others, such as the Organization of American
States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African
Union, the Commonwealth and MERCOSUR, may suspend states whose

10.
11.

See generally DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard Burchill ed., Ashgate
Publ'g 2006); DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory H. Fox &

Brad R. Roth eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.

46(1992).
12.

Article 21 states, "[tihe will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, GA Res. 217 (III), at 75, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.
10, 1948). See also, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16,

1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179; First Protocol to the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, 213

13.

14.

U.N.T.S. 262; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 23, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673; African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 13, June
27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58.
See EDWARD R. MCMAHON & SCO'. H. BAKER, PIECING A DEMOCRATIC QUILT
(Kumarian Press 2006); THE UN ROLE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN IDEALS
AND REALITY (Edward Newman & Roland Rich eds., United Nations Univ. Press 2004);
BJORNLAND, supra note 2.
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union provides that democracy and respect for human
fights, as set forth in the European Convention on Human Rights, shall be pre-conditions
for membership in the European Union. Treaty on European Union, Title I(F), Feb. 7, 1992,
31 I.L.M. 247.
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democratic regimes are interrupted or removed. 15 These mechanisms highlight a
unique legal aspect of democracy promotion: its necessary connection to the
legitimacy of national governments. If democratic procedures are in place that
accord with international standards, especially regarding elections, a government
that emerges from those procedures will enjoy a cloak of legal legitimacy. The
essential theory of all democratic systems is a link between the will of the people
and the power to govern. The democratic entitlement simply embeds this idea in
international law. Thus, when a democratically elected government is overthrown
or otherwise compromised, its legal capacity to represent the state is also
compromised. If an international organization takes this principle of democratic
legitimacy seriously, it cannot treat the non-democratic government as the
legitimate representative of the state.
None of this is to say that the international law addressing democracy
15.

The Washington Protocol to the OAS Charter provides for the suspension from the General

Assembly of any member state whose democratically constituted government has been
overthrown by force. OAE/Ser.P, AG/doc.ll (XVI-E/92), rev. 1 (1992). In the 1991
Moscow Document of the CSCE, the OSCE's predecessor, the participating states declared

that they "condemn unreservedly forces which seek to take power from a representative
government of a participating State against the will of the people as expressed in free and
fair elections and contrary to the justly established constitutional order" and would "support
vigorously, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in case of overthrow or
attempted overthrow of a legitimately elected government of a participating State by
undemocratic means, the legitimate organs of that State upholding human rights,
democracy and the rule of law, recognizing their common commitment to countering any
attempt to curb these basic values." Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,
Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, Oct. 3, 1991, paras. 17.2 & 17.3, 30 I.L.M. 1670 (1991). Article 30 of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union provides that "Governments which shall come to
power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of
the Union." Constitutive Act of the African Union, Art. 30, July 11, 2000, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/23.15, available at http://www.africa-union.org. In the Commonwealth, the
1995 Millbrook Action Programme provides that "in the event of an unconstitutional
overthrow of a democratically elected government" a variety of steps may be taken,
including "pending restoration of democracy, exclusion of the government concerned from
participation at ministerial-level meetings of the Commonwealth, including Commonwealth
Heads of Government Meetings" and "suspension of participation at all Commonwealth
meetings and of Commonwealth technical assistance if acceptable progress is not recorded
by the government concerned after a period of two years." The Millbrook Commonwealth
Action Programme on the Harare Declaration, paras. I(B)(3)(vi) & (vii) (1995), available at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Intemal/20723/34458/the-millbrook-commonwealth-ac
tion.programme. MERCOSUR's 1996 Protocol of Ushuaia provides that any disruption of
democracy in a member state may lead to the suspension of that state's right to participate
in MERCOSUR organs and a suspension of its rights under the preferential trade
instruments promulgated by the organization. Protocol de Ushuaia Sobre Compromiso
Democrtico en el Mercosur, la Republica de Bolivia y la Republica de Chile, arts. 4 & 5,

July 24, 1998, availableat http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/compilationlD.htm#ushuaia.
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promotion answers every question of political democracy or that it enjoys universal
acceptance. Neither is true. But as our panel of (mostly) political scientists
addresses democracy promotion from (predominantly) empirical and policy-based
perspectives, keep in mind that the questions they raise speak to an increasingly
comprehensive body of international norms.
Greg Fox, Moderator
My name is Greg Fox and I teach in the law school at Wayne State University.
This is the panel on the Future of Democracy Promotion After Iraq. After we gave
the panel this name, I realized that at this moment we were not actually "after
Iraq." But I think the meaning of Iraq in the world of democracy promotion will
become clear during the course of the discussion. I would like to explain why this
topic seemed interesting. It really stems from a discussion that I think is happening
both within foreign policy and international law circles, but also in the sort of
general media, about the wisdom of democracy promotion.
Democracy promotion became, in a sense, a big business in the 1990s. There
was a surge of optimism after the end of the cold war about the possibility of
spreading democracy throughout the world. But what you might describe as the
slow train wreck in Iraq has resurrected a lot of debates that to some people
seemed, if not completely resolved, close to resolution, before Iraq. One starts to
hear arguments about the wisdom, the morality, the motivation for outsiders
seeking to implant democratic institutions in other countries. And those arguments
are made with increasing frequency.
So having a panel of experts on this topic seemed like a very good idea. The
panel was also partly motivated by a very interesting article which is included in
the MCLE materials that were distributed to you. The article by Thomas
Carothers, which appeared in Foreign Affairs last year, is entitled "The Backlash
Against Democracy Promotion."' 6 Carothers' focus is much broader than Iraq; he
discusses places like Russia, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Zimbabwe, Eritrea,
and others, where there seems to be a pushback against outside efforts to have
clean elections and other reforms that are part and parcel of the democracy
promotion package.
Carothers says that the common thread among these reactions is the view of the
United States as a shadowy guiding force (those are his words) behind the rise of
pro-democratic movements in different countries. He also says that the other
reasons why anti-American sentiment seems to resonate around the world, now
16.

Thomas Carothers, The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion, 85 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 55,
March/April 2006.
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more than ever, have made those sorts of accusations find fertile soil.
He does acknowledge that these problems may simply be the result of
democracy promotion being successful and thus more threatening to autocrats
around the world. But he also focuses on both the rhetoric and policies of the Bush
Administration as being particularly problematic. This combination of talk and
policy has brought about a perception that democracy promotion is not about a
clean process, but about specific outcomes. This might make democracy
promotion, if you view it that way, indistinguishable from a policy of regime
change which is also associated with this administration.
I would like to take a moment to mention the variety of reasons why the subject
of democracy promotion has been of interest to international lawyers. First, all
major human rights treaties guarantee a right to political participation in some
form, most of them deriving from Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.' 7 Second, many international organizations, most prominently the
United Nations but also the European Union, the Organization of American States,
the Commonwealth and others, have taken up democracy promotion as one of their
central goals and have dedicated substantial resources to election monitoring and a
whole variety of other activities.
There have been some rather interesting enforcement mechanisms that have
developed around the idea of democracy promotion. We will be hearing a little bit
about one such mechanism in the Organization of American States. Those
mechanisms involve what I think is the central legal problem in democracy
promotion - governments that do not retain power through democratic means are,
according to a norm of democracy, illegitimate. That is, they do not have the
normal agency relationship that governments usually have with states. If you take
a strict view of that idea of legitimacy, such governments are not entitled, for
example, to represent that state in an international organization. And so there have
been, for example, a number of credentials fights at the United Nations, most
prominently in the cases of Haiti and Cambodia where two delegations showed up,
both purporting to represent the same state, and a decision had to be as to which
one was the appropriate one to seat.
All of this can be put under the umbrella of what Thomas Franck has called the
democratic entitlement.' 8 There is now a substantial amount of practice and a

17.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., I

t

plen.

mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
18.

See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 46 (1992).
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substantial amount of commentary on that practice in international law involving
issues of democratic governance.
Larry Diamond, Panelist*
Actually I do not want to talk about Iraq. I have been trying to get away from
talking about Iraq. I think Iraq is probably lost for a generation, and certainly any
prospect of promoting democracy in Iraq has been lost. The mistake of having
invaded in the first place has very significantly set back both our moral authority
and our geopolitical capacity to promote democracy elsewhere in the world, which
is what I want to talk about.
Let me begin by saying that it could be argued that President Bush is the most
pro-democracy and pro-democracy-promotion president in American history.
Certainly no previous American president has so elevated the goal of promoting
democracy and freedom, which he regards as God's gift to humanity as the central
goal of his foreign policy. And so much that he has done, including a supposed
reorientation of our foreign policy toward the Middle East, a dramatic increase in
overall foreign aid, the biggest increase in foreign aid in several decades even
absent our intervention in Iraq, the creation of a whole new facility for democracy
and development assistance in the Millennium Challenge account, nearly doubling
the budget of the National Endowment for Democracy and much more, are
indicators of this increased political commitment by this administration to the
promotion of democracy.
Another democracy promoting activity, at least in theory, is the creation of a
new specific instrument to promote democracy and development in the Middle
East called the Middle East Partnership Initiative. In November of 2003, President
Bush gave a very historic speech marking the twentieth anniversary of the creation
of the National Endowment for Democracy, in which he, in theory, overturned
sixty years of American foreign policy in the Middle East saying this was all a
mistake, including the foreign policy of his father during the first President Bush's
four years in office. He said that in seeking to purchase stability at the price of
Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the
founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy. He also coordinates the democracy

program of the Center on Democracy Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford. He
spent the first three months of 2004 in Iraq. Professor Diamond served as a senior advisor
on governments to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. He is published
extensively;

some of his most

recent works are SQUANDERED VICTORY: THE AMERICAN

OCCUPATION AND THE BUNGLED EFFORT TO BRING DEMOCRACY TO IRAQ (2006),

DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY TOWARDS CONSOLIDATION (1999),
ASSESSING THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY (Larry Diamond &
2005).

and an edited volume,
Leonardo Morlino eds.,
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democracy in the Middle East, we got neither stability nor democracy. We need a
9
new approach that is going to put democracy first.'
Bush also pressured Hosni Mubarak in Egypt to hold competitive presidential
elections. Of course he proclaimed the triumph of the free elections that were held
in Iraq during the calendar year of 2005 and the whole American political project
of the supposed transition to democracy there. The elections in Palestine, the
Cedar revolution in Lebanon, etcetera, etcetera. And then all of a sudden the Bush
Administration found that Islamists were winning all these elections. Hamas in
Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon to some extent, the Muslim Brotherhood making
quite stunning electoral gains in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood likely would
have gone further if Mubarak had not stepped in and brutally repressed and rigged
the process of the parliamentary elections in later rounds.
I think it is apparent in the last year or two that the Bush Administration has
started backing off the democratic pressure on Egypt and elsewhere in the region,
has grown nervous about what has happened in Palestine, to the point of cutting off
assistance to its elected government.
And this is only the latest in a long, sad string of similar failed attempts about
which any expert on Latin America could give you chapter and verse. So if Sharon
wants to, I am sure she can give other examples of the duplicity, hypocrisy,
inconsistency of American efforts to promote democracy going back throughout
the twentieth century, if you start with Woodrow Wilson and his idealistic
commitment to promoting democracy.
So once again we get nervous about the result and we pull back. So far we have
not actively participated in overthrowing democratically elected governments, like
we did in Guatemala and Iran, for example, in the 1950s, or Chile in 1973, but we
certainly have once again lowered our ambitions and principles and dashed the
hopes and confidence of democrats in the Middle East. This has led them to be
very cynical. As a result of our massive incompetence in Iraq, many democrats in
the region thought that it was a deliberate act to sabotage the country and keep it
weak.
Now the result of our failure in Iraq and similar inconsistencies elsewhere, and
the general unilateral actions on the part of the Bush Administration, there has
been a backlash, and a very severe backlash, as Carothers writes. There has been
backlash against, first of all, democracy promotion. Where you see this backlash

19.

President George Bush, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National
Endowment for Democracy (Nov. 6, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.

The Future of Democracy PromotionAfter Iraq 301

in many countries, in Russia, in Venezuela, in Uzbekistan, in Belarus, throughout
Central Asia, and increasingly globally, because autocrats are learning from one
another. They are borrowing techniques of frustration and criminalization of
international flows of democracy assistance to shut down even fairly innocent and
transparent civil society enterprises.
This has gone very far in some of these countries and made it very difficult for
the conventional forms of democracy assistance to proceed. Beyond that there has
been a backlash against democracy itself in recent years. I refer you to the latest
annual report of Freedom House, where you can see that there are very significant
elements of erosion of levels of political freedom and civil liberties in many
countries in the world. 2°
I think this represents a trend in terms of the global democracy recession that
might be dated to the military coup in Pakistan in October of 1999, but is gathering
steam now with the military coup in Thailand last September, the deepening of
authoritarianism in Venezuela and Russia, the fact that Nigeria ceased to be a
democracy after the rigging of the 2003 elections. (Nigeria does not seem entirely
on track to climb out of that hole despite the elections that are supposed to take
place this year but probably will not be successful.)
Oil is a very big factor here, by the way. Russia, Venezuela and Nigeria, three
of the most prominent democracy reversals in recent years are all extremely oildependent states. There is not a single country in the world that derives at least
two-thirds of its export earnings from oil that is a democracy. 2' This is worth
keeping in mind.
Political crisis, scandal, and calls for presidential resignation have created a
sense of crisis about democracy even in countries like the Philippines and Taiwan
where democracy survives. And you know about the crisis over the 2006
presidential election in Mexico. So we are in a difficult period and in this difficult
period I think we need a new strategy. First of all, we urgently need to shore up
the existing democracies to help them make progress toward consolidation of
democracy. One of the problems here, the reason why democracy is so fragile, is it
just is not working very well to deliver what people want of democracy - which is
not only economic growth but a decent level of a rule of law, protection for human
rights, control of corruption as well as competent and transparent government.

20.

FREEDOM

HOUSE,

FREEDOM

IN THE

WORLD

(2006),

available at http://www.

freedomhouse.org (follow link to Freedom in the World).
21.

LARRY DIAMOND, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD FREE SOCIETIES

THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (New York Times Books,

2007, forthcoming).
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So part of the challenge in promoting democracies, which we have found in
studies of democracy over the last twenty years, is to create a stronger and more
competent state itself. States need more capacity to deliver needed services, but
more accountability and transparency too. This requires reforms to construct or
strengthen various agencies to provide what we call horizontal accountability or
separation of powers, checks and balances. Agencies such as counter-corruption
agencies, audit agencies, ombudsmen, freedom of information laws are all needed.
Obviously securing political independence is always a very dicey thing, and
professional capacity and recruitment and training of prosecutors and judges is
enormously important here.
Strengthening the autonomy and professionalism of independent central banks
and electoral commissions is another important element here. We need to go
beyond only giving assistance to these state organizations where there are officials
who are willing and able, and have the sense of purpose, to make use of these aid
flows in a way to strengthen their own organizations and to be serious agents of
accountability. We also need to give high priority to providing significant
technical, as well as financial assistance, and promote political solidarity to the
civil society organizations, the think tanks, the bar associations, the social
movements that are putting forth ideas, agendas, advocacy to try to strengthen
these rule of law, good governance, horizontal accountability, state building
institutions in these emerging but still weak democracies.
So that is one set of challenges. A second set is that we need to create the
incentives, the political will for political actors to take these difficult steps. And I
think we are not going to get there unless we condition our aid and trade flows
much more intensively on a demonstration of a sense of purpose on the part of
these governments, to be serious about implementing rule of law and good
governance reforms.
The Millennium Challenge Account was a step in this direction.22 It provides a
new foreign aid vehicle meant to rise to the level of $5 billion a year, but when you
are pouring three-fourths of a trillion dollars into Iraq and Afghanistan, there is not
a lot left to develop the rest of the world. So it is still stuck at around a billion
dollars or a little more. But in any case, the logic is that we set standards and
expectations on several dimensions of good governance and development
commitment, and states then compete against one another for the money. I think
the Millennium Challenge Account is flawed, because it is grading all of these

22.
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See http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/ites/O303/ijee/ijeeO303.htm.

The Future of Democracy PromotionAfter Iraq 303

states on a curve.
We need certain absolute standards for flows of aid, like the absolute standards
that the European Union has and applies in terms of its accession criteria for
admission to the European Union. I do not think they have to be that detailed and
invasive, but there do have to be certain absolute standards of commitment to
human rights, rule of law, transparency, good governance, judicial independence,
control of corruption if states want these extremely concessional aid flows.
Third, we need to strengthen regional and international institutions in their
commitment and capacity to promote and defend democracy like the Organization
of American States (OAS) for example. There has been some progress here. The
African Union has been moving in this direction but only on paper. Its African
peer review mechanism is largely superficial. If you could get that to be a serious
mechanism of collective scrutiny and pressure for better governance, that would be
an important step.
Fourth, we need to find ways to assist democrats in these closed and repressive
circumstances. Particularly where there is a backlash against the now established
mechanisms of democracy promotion, these traditional mechanisms are not going
to work. We need to find new ways, technologically, to give them solidarity and
assistance.
Fifth, there are some crucial things we need to stop doing, like stop acting so
arrogantly and unilaterally. We need to stop using unilateral force as a means to
try and change the world. I have said we need to be more consistent in the way we
go about things. We need to find ways, working with our democratic partners,
Europe, Japan, the OAS and so on, to rally moderate states to a collective cause of
democracy promotion.
And, finally, I will just mention that we really need to drastically reduce our
dependence on foreign oil. Because unless you get the price of oil down
significantly, I think, below $50 a barrel, these leading backlash states like Russia,
Venezuela, Nigeria, and all the states of the Middle East, Iran and so on, just have
too much cash in their pockets not to use it to frustrate democracy promotion
initiatives in their regions.
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Sharon Lean, Panelist*

You might ask, what is a Latin Americanist doing on a panel about the future of
democracy promotion after Iraq? Carothers' article on the backlash against
democracy promotion argues that this backlash has affected regions beyond the
Middle East.2 3 I agree with him, and see such a backlash affecting regional efforts

to support democracy in the Americas. I also believe that we can learn about
general prospects for democracy promotion by examining efforts in Latin America,
which is, arguably, the region with the longest and most extensive track record of
democracy promotion activities, certainly of those by the United States. There are,
for example, a number of very interesting international instruments that have been
developed in Latin America that are worth thinking about in comparative context.
My remarks today will focus on the question of the future of democracy
promotion in the Americas. What will be the shape of democracy promotion
activities in Latin America in the coming years? Answering this question requires
four elements: a definition of what we mean by democracy promotion; an
understanding of the history of democracy promotion in the region; an
understanding of regional tools or instruments for promoting democracy; and
perhaps most importantly, an assessment of how well those tools can be utilized in
the current political context.
I will first briefly discuss the first two, the definition and the history. I will
spend more time on tools, because I assume that will be of particular interest to an
international legal audience. I will also comment on the current political context
and what it means for democracy promotion prerogatives in the region and perhaps
more broadly.
How do we define democracy promotion? In Latin America the very idea of
democracy promotion has been contested from the time it was first proposed. The
term democracy promotion is most frequently used in what I will call a "valueneutral" sense, to refer to international engagement in and management of state

Sharon Lean is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Wayne State
University. She is the editor of a volume entitled PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE
AMERICAS (Sharon Lean, ed., Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming 2007), and also

23.

author of International Assistance to Domestic Election Monitoring Organizations:
Conditions for Success, J. DEMOCRATIZATION (forthcoming), as well as the author of
numerous other publications. Highly relevant to this panel, she has monitored elections in a
variety of places, including Mexico's transitional 2000 election, Peru's transitional 2001
elections, and Venezuela's 2003/2004 recall referenda. Most recently, she helped
coordinate the Carter Center's election observation in Nicaragua last November.
Thomas Carothers, The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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capacity-building initiatives designed to strengthen democracy. Critics, however,
see democracy promotion as intervention on behalf of a very particular form of
From either
"low-intensity" democracy tied to free market economics. 24
perspective, it is understood that democracy promotion is practiced by both
governmental and nongovernmental actors, and is a central expression of what we
might call soft power in the post-Cold War era. 25
The debate about democracy promotion derives from the mixed history of the
practice. When we look at the historical record in Latin America, the reasons for
this division are clear. The United States has a long track record of adverse actions
justified by a democracy promotion discourse, which begin with intervention in the
name of protecting the independence of our neighbors to the south and include
participating in the overthrow of democratically elected leaders with socialist
leanings, propping up authoritarian allies and funding death squads in Central
America during the height of the Cold War.26
From the late 1980s, U.S. democracy promotion has progressed into a kinder,
gentler (yet still contested) form, focusing on electoral assistance and institutionHowever, the undemocratic history of United States political
building.
interference is very much alive in the collective memory of Latin Americans. This
is something to keep in mind as we think about the development of international
instruments and the current context for democracy promotion in the region. While
I am sympathetic to critics who question the intent of democracy promotion, unlike
some, I do not call for an end to the practice.
My analysis parts from the observation that democracy promotion will continue,
simply because political processes in the Americas are increasingly
transnationalized. Political change in the region is fueled not only by domestic
actors and actions, but also by what occurs in key political centers (such as
Washington, D.C.), at the meetings of regional and subregional organizations and
even in the quasi-spatial dimension of the Internet. The construction of regional
norms of democracy in the Americas is a multifaceted and uncontained process.
No matter the backlash, regional democracy promotion is likely to continue in
some form or another. The question is: what form it will take?
In part the form it takes will depend on the methods that are used. We can
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classify the democracy promotion "tools" currently used in the Americas into two
categories. The first category includes the array of international "defense of
democracy" instruments that have developed over time. The second refers to the
practice of what I will call political aid.
Let us consider the international instruments for democracy promotion in some
detail. The Organization of American States (OAS), the regional intergovernmental
organization for the Americas, expanded its legalization of democracy norms in the
1990s. The region now has a more developed defense of democracy regime than at
any other time in its history. Some of the elements of this regime include the OAS
Office for the Promotion of Democracy (established in 1990). This office has
monitored over 70 elections in the region since it was founded. In 1991, the
organization passed the Santiago Commitment to Democracy, 2 7 in which states
declared their determination to strengthen representative democracy. Resolution
1080,28 also passed in 1991, specifies that the Permanent Council of the
Organization must convene in the event of a sudden or irregular interruption of the
democratic political institutional process. It is stipulated that such a meeting
should happen within ten days and should result in some recommendation of
action.
The Washington Protocol,29 which came into effect in September 1997,
authorizes the OAS, on a two-thirds member vote, to suspend any government that
has seized power by force. Perhaps the most notable instrument is the InterAmerican Democratic Charter (IADC), 30 adopted September 11, 2001. The IADC
declares that "the peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy, their
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it." The IADC gives the
OAS, by two-thirds vote, the authority to suspend member states experiencing an
"unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order" thereby broadening, in
essence, the Washington Protocol. It also specifies numerous elements of what is
meant by representative democracy, including citizen participation, the rule of law,
free and fair elections and effective separation of powers.
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There is ongoing conversation about deepening the Inter-American Democratic
Charter. At the meeting of the Organization held in 2005 in Ft. Lauderdale, the
United States circulated a draft proposal for the Declaration of Florida designed to
clarify some of the provisions in the IADC. The draft suggested that
democratically elected leaders who breached democratic practices could face
sanctions under the OAS Charter. It called for ongoing monitoring and an
assessment mechanism to determine when deterioration of democratic practices
was underway.
The U.S. draft was rejected by a large majority of member states. Reportedly,
only 6 of 34 states indicated signs of support in the assembly meeting. Many of
the members present took the proposal as an attempt on the part of the United
States to gain leverage for additional intervention in Venezuela.
The Declaration of Florida as ultimately passed provided only that the Secretary
General should consult with the Permanent Council to "devise proposals for...
timely initiatives" to address situations that "might affect the workings of the
political process of democratic institutions."'', The Declaration of Florida also lent
encouragement to a competing proposal, by endorsing the continuing efforts of a
working group to develop a proposal for an Inter-American Social Charter, an
initiative to legalize norms to protect social and economic (rather than political)
equality.
OAS instruments for defense of democracy are evolving. Some of the actions
that have occurred under the rubric of the democratic charter, such as mediation
strategies, or what Cooper and Legler have called "intervention without
intervening", have been quite effective. 32 On the other hand, the application of
OAS instruments has been mixed: they have not been evoked in all applicable
cases, or applied with equal rigor. 33 For example, provisions of the Charter were
not fully implemented in 2004 when elected President Aristide in Haiti was forced
out of office by rebels and protesters.
It should be noted, though, that the OAS is not the only regional body that has
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institutionalized democracy norms. There is a body called the Rio Group,
established in 1986, of which most nations of the Americas are members,
excluding the United States. It was created as a specific alternative to the OAS,
which at the time was perceived to be dominated by the United States. The Rio
Group holds democracy as a criterion for membership. Mercosur, the southern
market, established by the 1996 Ushuaia Declaration, 34 commits members to apply
joint trade and economic sanctions against disruption of democratic institutions.
This provision has been applied in Paraguay in 1996, for example. The Andean
community together signed the Additional Protocol of Cartagena,35 in 1998. Its
provisions are quite similar to the Mercosur sanctions.
There is also CARICOM, the association of 16 Caribbean states. Its 1992
Charter of Civil Society 36 holds that states shall ensure the existence of a fair and
open democratic system through the holding of free elections at reasonable
intervals. The South American Community of Nations and another regional
trading group called the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) embrace
democracy as a criterion for membership with relatively weaker mechanisms for
enforcement.
Such international instruments, however, are really only one side of the story.
The other main tool for democracy promotion is political aid to state and nonstate
actors. Some political aid is bilateral, and some is transnational. Political aid is
typically provided in the form of funding, supplies and technical assistance for
elections, election officials, political parties, judiciaries, civic associations and
police and security forces.
Significant bilateral political aid in the region originates with the U.S. State
Department and the United States Agency for International Development, but the
United States is by no means the only actor in this arena. Canada, for example, is
increasingly involved in providing bilateral political aid for sustaining and
supporting democratic institutions. The members of the European Union separately
and together, as well as many other states (notably Japan, Sweden, and Norway)
are common political aid providers to countries in the Americas.
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There are also transnational political aid mechanisms, such as the Friends of the
Democratic Charter which has its secretariat in the Carter Center's Americas
program. This group brings together former elected officials, human rights
officials and academic advisors to discuss ways to strengthen the principles put
forward in the Inter-American Democratic Charter, make its triggers more specific,
and strengthen its preventive capacity.
Finally there are south-south networks with international impact that can be
considered within the rubric of transnational political aid. Specifically I am
thinking of the Acuerdo de Lima (Lima Agreement),37 signed in Lima, Peru in
2001 by nongovernmental civic organizations from across the region. The member
organizations of this network all work to promote good governance and democratic
consolidation. They exchange advice, program strategies and expertise through
this network. They interact with "northern" nongovernmental grantees of the U.S.
National Endowment for Democracy, but this network is primarily "south-south"
innature.
To summarize: there are relatively well-developed international instruments for
democracy promotion in the Americas. The triggers are not clearly defined, but
the instruments themselves have been used, although not consistently, in a variety
of countries. The instruments are principally retroactive, they cannot be used to
prevent crises, only spur international involvement when there is a clear and
recognized problem. Political aid, on the other hand, is proactive. However,
political aid has the potential to be more controversial. It is the political aid
component of democracy promotion that critics of the practice denounce as
interventionist and anti-democratic. Further, evaluations of political aid have
found that the effect of political aid is minimal at best, and highly dependent on the
character and capabilities of the individual administrators of such aid.38
There are three main challenges in the current political context that shape our
potential to use available tools for democracy promotion. The first challenge is the
increasing number of cases of backsliding by democratically-elected leaders. This
type of backsliding presents a challenge to the international community. In order
to apply international instruments, we must be able to define the line that indicates
a breach with democracy or constitutional order. The principal example we can
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look to right now is the case of Hugo Chdvez in Venezuela. In late 2006, Chdivez
was granted the right to rule by decree for 18 months by a legislature that is
entirely stacked with Chdvez supporters due, in part, to the fact that the opposition
boycotted the 2005 legislative elections. Is this a serious breech of democracy?
Should the international community be involved, and if so, how?
The second contextual factor to think about is the challenge of undemocratic
behavior by actors other than political leaders. We see in Latin America a rise of
mass protests that have been so extensive as to displace democratically elected
leaders from their offices; this type of action is quite distinct from your traditional
military coup. For example, although elections are regularly held to determine
officeholders in Ecuador, the last time a president of Ecuador finished a full term
of office was over a decade ago. When and how should the international
community be involved when mass protest begins to destabilize an elected
government?
The third challenge is quite different from the first two. This challenge is
represented by the efforts of actors in the new Latin American left to
reconceptualize prevailing ideas of democracy, prioritizing popular democracy
over representative democracy. This debate is tied into the proposal for
development of an Inter-American Social Charter discussed earlier. It is a
"problem" in the sense that the instruments and tools, and much of the assumptions
of political aid that is provided in the region, are designed to support democracy
conceptualized as representative democracy.
Consider the following two examples. Venezuela's Hugo Chdvez has been
recently cited disparaging the state of U.S.-style representative democracy: "if only
the United States had democracy like what we have here, if only the American
people could call a [popular] recall referendum. 3 9 In Mexico, Andres Manuel
L6pez Obrador, the second-place finisher in the highly contested presidential
elections of July 2006 has refused to acknowledge the official results. In protest, he
and his party held a separate presidential inauguration, and still claim to represent
the legitimate government of Mexico. 40 His party, the Partido Revolucionario
Democrdtico (PRD), was involved in the massive protests against the rising price
of tortillas held across Mexico in early 2007. L6pez Obrador and the PRD define
their actions as popular democracy, and denounce the notion of political equality in
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the absence of social equality as a farce.
A key challenge for would-be democracy promoters is the growing disconnect
between relatively narrow conceptions of procedural or representative democracy
that many of our international instruments and tools are equipped to promote and
defend, and the expectations Latin American citizens hold of democracy. Their
expectations embody broader substantive notions of equality and effective
representation.
That said, it is likely that legalization of democracy norms will continue, and
the debate over definitions of democracy will be at the forefront of this process. I
believe, however that political aid from the United States to Latin America may
decrease in the near future, in part because in some places it will be resisted and in
part because in other places there are other actors stepping in to provide proactive
democracy assistance.
It is also important to note that despite the presence of notable challenges to
democracy promotion in the region, there are examples that demonstrate durable
and positive downstream effects of democracy promotion. The Peruvian civic
association Transparencia, which anchors the Lima Agreement, benefited early on
from extensive U.S. political aid and good coordination with officials from the
OAS. Transparencia and many of its civic counterparts in the region now have
over a decade of organizing experience, have become adept at monitoring their
own elections, enjoy quite a lot of domestic prestige, and have diversified their
sources of finance such that their principal funders include (domestic)
governmental and private sector sources, followed by an array of international
funders that do not include the United States as a principal.
Even if we are critical about the provision of political aid or skeptical about the
democracy promotion discourse of the United States, we should not underestimate
the democratic capabilities of local actors who have been supported by democracy
promotion efforts, even U.S. political aid. And so, in that sense, I think that the
Latin American cases demonstrate some room for optimism about democracy
promotion, even in the face of the current backlash against it.
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Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Panelist*
I should also probably start with the question of what a Russian, Eastern
European specialist is doing on a democracy promotion panel. I am going to talk
to you a little bit about what has happened in Russia over the last fifteen or so
years and at the same time get us a little bit more engaged in whole question as to
whether or not the United States should even be in this business. Larry mentioned
that we have been in this business a very long time. But, we are not yet
particularly good at it. And Iraq has thrown that into pretty sharp relief. But let us
look at a couple of other places, like Russia for example, where we have not done
so well either but failed in different ways.
Just to give you a sense of the scope of U.S. democracy promotion, in 2005, we
spent about $1.4 billion on democracy assistance. There is a proliferation of U.S.
government institutions involved, too numerous to mention but the big ones of
course National Endowment for Democracy, USAID. We also have lots of private
agencies involved.
There is still not a lot of success, and Russia is a case of this. I want to back up
and ask whether or not we should be doing this? As I mentioned, I do not think we
should necessarily take it as a given that it is a good idea for the U.S. go out and
promote democracy. Certainly a lot of people think it is not a good idea, this has
also been a longstanding debate in United States foreign policy.
I am going to quickly review the moral reasons, economic reasons, and security
reasons. The moral reasons - just a quick quote there from Winston Churchill
basically saying it is the best of otherwise bad forms of government, meaning it is
the best of the worst. Bram Inglehart, a sociologist from the University of
Michigan, conducted a survey in 2005 on whether or not democracy is the best
form of government. When you ask about whether or not we should promote
democracy, it looks like it might be a more welcome enterprise than you might
have otherwise suspected, and certainly post-Iraq, when this data was collected.
Governance advantages - essentially there are arguments that democracies are
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better at protecting basic human rights. They tend to respect international treaties
more than non-democracies and to sign them more. They are better at constraining
the power of the state. Democracies tend not to commit genocide, do not starve
their people, and they are, because they are democracies, better at representing the
will of the people. Other governance advantages are that democracies do not fight
each other. This is the concept of democratic peace popularized by Michael
Doyle 4 ' and other scholars. And democracies are more stable, they are less prone
to coups and of course having mechanisms for transferring power. I am going to
talk about Russia in a few minutes, and you will note that a mechanism for
transferring power is something that is lacking there in particular, which is what
makes it unstable potentially in 2008 when President Putin is supposed to step
down.
In regards to the point that democracies do not fight each other, I just want to
emphasize there, because it is the closest thing we have to a lock I think, in
political science. That is something that appears to apply across a broad historical
timeframe and geographic timeframe, and it has certainly been accepted as a law of
US foreign policy. You will hear that both President Clinton and President Bush
have brought this up repeatedly in the last fifteen or so years. Democracies do not
fight each other, therefore let us spread democracy around the world. There are
some people who challenge that claim, but it is a pretty robust one, actually.
Lastly, economic advantages - democratic states tend to constrain creditors,
that is an internal creditory state.

So the more democratic institutions you have,
something that Larry has called horizontal accountability, where the institutions of
democracies, representative parliaments, check elected presidents, for example,
you have internal auditing institutions. These can all do things like control
corruption. Now this is a more controversial claim; I think if you checked in with
citizens of Sweden or even Canada they would wonder whether or not democracies
are effective at holding down taxes. But nonetheless, democracies are arguably
more effective at holding down taxes than are autocracies, and of course better at
securing property rights, broadly understood.
Another economic advantage is that democratic leaders need to produce
economic results to stay in power. They have a performance legitimacy issue; if
they want to stay in power, they have got to do something. Offer the population
public goods and services and make the economy grow. Autocratic leaders, on the
other hand, only usually need to satisfy a subset of the population.
41.
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property owners, maybe it is the military, but it is not universal. Democracies also
can learn. They can adjust policies, stop failed policies, in a way that autocracies
can not necessarily do.
And then the third set of economic advantages is the political stability that
democracy tends to provide, promotes, and facilitates growth. I will not go into
Latin America versus the United States, but I will just make this quick point that
democracies may have slower growth, but it is steadier growth. Autocracies have
both hares and turtles, that is, states that grow really quickly economically and
some that lag. Like Zaire, for example, and China.
On average, democracies are more stable. So presumably what you would want
is steady growth, not erratic growth, which is what autocracies tend to provide. So
that is the economic argument really. Democracy in other places is good for the
United States, because open markets and democracy go hand in hand. We had a
trillion dollar windfall from the collapse of Communism, so it was a good thing
economically. Referring to security reasons, every enemy of the United States was
and is a dictatorship. So transformation of autocracies into democracies has made
the U.S. safer. Even though this is hard, we are not very good at it, and our tools
are limited.
Okay, so what happened in Russia? In 1996, Yeltsin danced his way into the
presidency again. He makes it but he has a massive heart attack and had quadruple
bypass surgery. But he turned 76 yesterday. He is now, I guess, the dowager
president of the Russian Federation. Yeltsin was the first president of Russia, the
first elected chief executive of Russia. And he presided over a very lively
democracy, a raucous democracy if you will, one without limits, because there
seemed to be no limits on a whole number of things. For example freedom of
speech, very few limits on what could be put into print, what could be shown on
television. There were very few limits in terms of business dealings and what was
appropriate behavior. But the one area where Russia could have used many more
limits was with law, because the law under Yeltsin was limited in its effect and in
its implementation.
This helped to bring about disillusionment with democracy among the mass
public under Yeltsin. So one of the reasons that he is dancing at a rock concert in
1996 so fiercely is because when he began his election campaign in January of
1996 to regain the Russian presidency for a second term, he had single digit
approval ratings. Low 10 percent approval ratings, and miraculously thundered
back and danced his way back into the presidency with just over 50 percent in a
second round of voting.

The Futureof Democracy PromotionAfter Iraq 315

Yeltsin resigned, surprisingly before his second term ended in December of
1999. He goes on television and basically apologizes to the Russian people. He
says, what we thought would be easy, and I am quoting him directly here, "what
we thought would be easy, constructing democracy and getting the economy to
grow, turned out to be very difficult." And so in March of 2000, he tells the
Russian people I am now going to hand power over to my designated preferred
successor, Vladimir Putin, whom you will elect. In August of 1999, just a few
months earlier, Yeltsin had nominated him to parliament and had approved Putin to
be the most recent of Yeltsin's prime ministers. He had five prime ministers in
very rapid succession over about an 18 month period, Putin was the fifth. Putin
comes in and is elected in March of 2000.
We did not know what was coming in 2000, he talked about a dictatorship of
law and he is a lawyer. We were not exactly sure what that meant, but Russians
embraced that message over time. Because what Yeltsin had done was not build
up rule of law in his country, and this has continued to be a problem. It is a
problem for the growth of Russia's democracy; it is also a problem for the
consolidation of economic growth in Russia. So this was a welcome message.
The problem is that as he has instituted the dictatorship of law in Russia, since
Putin came into power, we have started to see a sure decline in terms of the quality
of democracy in Russia. In fact, in 2005 the Freedom House, for the first time
moved Russia from the category in the middle here, "partly free" to the category of
"not free. ' '4 2 And you can see that its compatriots here in this category are not
exactly a distinguished band of states. Turkmenistan is down there with the lowest
possible score. In 2006 I believe Russia's score has dropped another half point, so
it is at 6.0 and getting even lower, and increasingly competitive with central Asian
dictatorships in terms of where it is going under Putin.
I raise this because this has all happened at a time that U.S. spending on
democracy promotion under USAID, in particular the Agency for International
Development, has declined. So, since 2000, USAID has spent less and less and
less on things like political party development, on civil society development, 43 and
just as the quality of democracy in Russia has declined, so that Russia can not even
be considered a democracy any longer pretty much by any measure.
So is Russia lost or is there something that we can do to bring Russia back from
this lack of democracy under Putin? It faces a couple of challenges, and it is
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something that we are not actually very well equipped to deal with. As Larry
mentioned to you, there are very few, in fact no, export resource dependent states
whose economies are predominantly dependent on oil or gas exports, that are
democracies. Well, Russia unfortunately has joined that group. It is the world's
second-largest oil producer and exporter now, behind Saudi Arabia, and Russia's
economy has been growing since 1999, growing on average at about a 7 percent
rate.
So you can take these resource curves in the sense that since this money is
flowing into the state, the state has very little interest in building up its
infrastructural capacity with tax, and if it is not taxing people then it does not feel it
has to be accountable to people. So you can see how this vicious cycle of resource
dependence, and dependence on export revenues, is driving, or could be a possible
driver, of a lack of democracy in Russia.
It is a very hard thing for us to fight against. The only thing we can do, I think,
is sell our SUVs and drive cars that are better on gas and help Russia that way.
Russia's elite state is very politically institutionalized, and this is one of the
failures of our attempts at promoting democracy in Russia is that we did not focus
enough on specifically the institutions of democracies like political parties that
could really have bolstered it.
For example, how many of you in the room know that President Putin belongs
to no political party whatsoever? There is one he favors, but he is not a member of
it. Of course, Yeltsin also was not a member of a political party. They both felt
that this would cheapen, in some way, the president and kept insisting that the
president was above politics, which in a democracy, is of course, an absurd
statement.
So did we fail with democracy promotion in Russia? Well, there was a virtual
army of democracy assistance organizations active in Russia. You could trip over
them in Moscow. I did a lot of work in the provinces in Russia. I tripped over a
lot of them there too. I think probably expectations were perhaps too high, and I
think that is the general problem in democracy promotion. For democracy
promotion tools to work there really has to be a domestic constituency that is
receptive to democracy. That is, to honor some of the agreements that Sharon
spoke about, but they also used to make elections work so that they are actually
meaningful, and electoral commissions function to monitor elections. And I think
expectations were perhaps just too high to meet.
And I think ultimately Russians lost Russia, and Russian policymakers lost
Russia. So you can not blame the U.S. for everything. But democracy assistance
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could have been better, and we have a few tools left still. International
organizations that have been involved with Russia, and I have been involved with
this for the last 10 or 15 years, have ignored a lot of the evidence of superficial
compliance to organizational norms. And the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where I was consulting in November, actually has
now realized that they were focusing too much on the forms of compliance rather
than the substance. They feel very awkward about it and are looking for ways to
get Russia to comply further, because it is turning into a real spoiler in the OSCE
currently.
A lot depends on who does the democratizing. Too often we have people who
are twenty-five years old or younger out there spreading the good word of
democracy, and while they are extremely energetic and there may be compelling
logistical reasons as to why they are the ones doing it, when you think of who
promotes economic policy and market reform policy, it is not twenty-five-year-old
economists. Rather, it is Jeff Sachs and people with far more experience.
Also, even though we are spending a lot, we are still not really spending
enough. The U.S. actually did not spend the most in terms of democracy
promotion in Russia, instead Germany did. And so there is also a lack of
coordination among agencies. This lack of coordination is not only within our own
agencies in the United States, but also within other international agencies with
foreign governments who were active at the time, again were tripping over one
another, coming up with programs that contradicted one another.
And then finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is a lack of political will
in the domestic arena to democratize. Democracy, in Latin America in some ways,
the way we understand democracy, is becoming a harder sell. If your economy is
growing and your middle class is getting fat and happy, and that is what is
happening in Russia, particularly in Moscow, then there is a lack of political will to
make some hard choices, economically and politically, and create a more robust
democracy. And I think this is the key issue.
But just because the task has been difficult, and we have been relatively
unsuccessful in Russia, we should not give up. Russia is a huge country, and has,
of course, no democratic history. It is an incredibly expansive country, and to try
and govern it all from Moscow, which has been the case, in the absence of political
institutions, is a mammoth task. And then add into the mix a variety of
international organizations trying to get involved, you can see how difficult it
would be. It has always been hard to govern, but even more so lately.
But we should not give up. We can learn from what has worked in other places.
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In Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia for the last five years we have had democratic
breakthroughs. And I think it is particularly important in the next two years that
we not give up on Russia and that actually far from cutting back our financial
commitment to democracy promotion in Russia, we should be increasing it,
especially now when President Putin has to make a decision as to whether or not he
will run again in 2007, against what the constitution says. We also have a
parliamentary election in December of this year in Russia, and we have no
effective election monitoring. The OSCE is not being allowed in. The media has
been muzzled by President Putin, and so now is exactly the time when we need to
bolster efforts, within Russian civil society, to do election monitoring.
And then finally, some of the few bits of leverage that we still have are things
like Russia's membership in the G8. It was an absolute fiasco this summer that
Russia was hosting the G8. A lot of political officials in Europe and the United
States were wringing their hand about this and how embarrassing it was, but
ultimately they went to St.Petersburg nonetheless. 44 Actually it might be okay to
let Russia into the World Trade Organization, and I would urge the U.S.
government to do it sooner rather than later. Why? Open trade tends to promote
democracy; it tends to promote more transparent politics as well.
So I will stop there, but as you can see, there is a huge challenge still in Russia.
We did some things well, but we did a lot of things not so well. And we have a
few tools left, but we have not really taken full advantage of them.
Helen Stacy, Panelist*
As an international human rights lawyer, I see the task of democracy promotion
abroad very much like the task of human rights promotion abroad. First of all,
there is a moral issue. How do we justify a universal vision of the good life, as a
matter of moral persuasion? Second, in the absence of any universal application of
that single standard, how ought we to treat the other nation states of the world that
do not agree with us? Finally, if we want to hang on to that idea of the vision of
how the world should be, either in terms of democracy or human rights, what does
that entitle us to do if we want to try and pursue that vision abroad?
44.

See, e.g., Damian Grammaticus, Russia Takes Over G8 Leadership, available at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4573388.stm.
*

Helen Stacy is the third of our panelists from the Center for Democracy Development and
the Rule of Law at Stanford. In addition to being a senior research scholar at the center, she

is also a lecturer at Stanford University School of Law. Ms. Stacy also has numerous
publications, including International Human Rights in a Fragmenting World, in HUMAN
RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALISM (Andris Saj6 ed., 2004),
Relational Sovereignty, 55 STANFORD L. R. 2029 (2003), and HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
GLOBALIZED WORLD (Stanford University Press, forthcoming).

The Future of Democracy Promotion After Iraq 319

Regrettably, the debacle of Iraq means that democracy promotion must today
defend itself from claims of imperialism and empire. And it doesn't help that God
and democracy promotion are spoken of in the same breath. In December last
year, Orlando Patterson, asked in a piece in the New York Times whether the U.S.
had really gone way astray by referencing to religious ideology when talking about
democracy in Iraq. 45 Let me read excerpts from two of President Bush's speeches,
one from his second inaugural speech, and another made in a speech made to Arab
Americans sometime later.

President Bush declared that he had: "complete
confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom [in Iraq] because freedom is the
46
permanent hope of mankind, the hunger in dark places, the longing of the soul.,
Later, at the Arab-American conference, President Bush said: "No matter what
47
your faith, freedom is God's gift to every person in every nation.
For better or worse, critics of the U.S. and the West are likely to connect this
sort of messianic self-assurance about democracy with the disaster in Iraq and
promotion per se. The hubris of the U.S.'s rhetoric presents liberal, political, and
philosophical problems by jettisoning all of classical liberalism's reliance upon
persuasion rather than coercion to spread liberal values. Democracy promotion,
Iraq style, threatens to remove the very foundations of liberal thought as an
ideology of consent, making it harder to persuade authoritarian regimes of the
virtues and the advantages of human rights and political engagement. Every
utterance President Bush makes about bringing freedom and liberty to Iraq is likely
to put another nail in the coffin of promoting democracy abroad, perhaps by years,
and, according to Larry, maybe by decades.
I think President Bush is, alas, drilling home the idea of military intervention in
the name of democracy promotions. It risks also painting economic intervention as
coercive. It suggests that democracy will simply open a Pandora's Box of civil
chaos, sectarian violence, and death and destruction. But as an international
lawyer, I want to remind you that the connection between invasion in the name of
democracy was a very late justification, a necessaryjustificatory apologia in Iraq,
simply because the U.S. had to scramble for an ex post rationale given the absence
of any weapons of mass destruction. The notion of spreading democracy in Iraq
needed to be raised as justification simply because there were no WMD. And yet,
notwithstanding this almost accidental use of freedom to justify invasion in Iraq,
the ensuing disaster is likely to be perceived as overreaching U.S. imperialism

45.
46.
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cloaked in high-sounding principles. So if the idea of an expressed right to
democracy, or even just a democratic entitlement, is to be considered, it is worth
thinking through some of the potential checks and balances that might have altered
the course of history had they been utilized in Iraq.
I am going to focus on three different aspects of democracy promotion after or
during Iraq, offered from my perspective as a believer in human rights. First, what
can be said today about the status of democracy as a useful principle in
international law that has acceptance among the nations of the world as a whole,
fifteen years on, and a whole world away, from the initial euphoria, post-Cold
War? Second, how did these developments impact the legitimate methods that
contemporary international law uses to promote democracy abroad? Does the right
to self determination under Article 21 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights,
even if it might have developed into a jus cogens principle of the right to
48
democracy, place a correlative duty on the international community to enforce it?
And who or what has the duty or the justification to enforce that right? The U.N.?
A multilateral force like NATO? A unilateral force with or without the coalition of
the willing? In other words, does international law today support intervention to
introduce or restore democratic governance in the same way that international law
seems to now, post Kosovo, support intervention to stop genocide? Finally, what
sort of democracy should be promoted? If self determination or even democracy is
a universal entitlement, then what sort of democracy should be promoted by
international law?
First, the idea of democracy as a universal entitlement. Article 21 of the U.N.
Charter, written in the very early days after World War II, talks only in terms of
the right to take part in government, and that the will of the people shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures.
Well, it is now well known that after the Cold War, a plethora of new
constitutions from South Africa to the Eastern European states to Latin American
states, created constitutions with a whole raft of human rights. Individual liberty
was a centerpiece of these constitutions. Liberty and freedom were the rhetoric,
but in fact the legal terminology was all based upon the individualism of human
rights.
But clearly there was something about democracy that the non-democratic
nations seemed to want. It was also clear that the Western world was increasingly
48.
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interested in the sorts of regimes that the formerly non-democratic states were
going to constitute. Liberal internationalists were pointing to evidence of a
growing recognition of an entitlement to democracy. In other words, democracy as
the modus vivendi was now virtually unquestioned in the post-Cold War world. In
1992, Thomas Franck in his seminal article made the claim that there was now an
emerging norm of an entitlement to democracy.49 And less sweepingly, Greg
made the suggestion that there may have been an emerging norm to free and fair
elections. In any event, it would seem that the idea of democracy promotion
through at least consensual agreements, whether that is the EU or Latin American
states, was and is still taking place.
Larry Diamond in 2002 made the point that three of every five independent
states in the world were democracies. We have heard from him just today that
these statistics show backsliding. So even with the current plateaued state of
democratization worldwide, human rights seems to be at least paper commitments
that even cash-strapped governments are making around the world. But as we
know, paper agreements don't necessarily lead to actual state practice. To be ajus
cogens principle, democracy would need to be established practice in the majority
of nation states. Given the relative newness of democracy as a global principle and
a given that it is far from established, I don't think there is enough evidence to
support the idea that there is today a principle of a right to democracy.
Secondly then, the use of international law to support democracy promotion
needs to canvas whether international law ought to support intervention to either
introduce or to restore democratic governance. Coming from my antipodean part
of the world, the intervention poster child was East Timor in 1999. That
intervention was in the name of preventing genocide. It was an intervention,
ultimately, that was permitted by Indonesia, although under great pressure from the
rest of the world. East Timor was granted sovereign status in 2002.
But East Timor, like many of the new governments of the world, has hit some
rough spots. As recently as last year there was another coup - and a reintervention by forces from at least four other nations of the world. However,
when analysts ask why East Timor seems unable to stabilize itself, no one seems to
ask if some of these problems may arise because democracy was imposed from the
outside. There has always been the assumption that East Timor's social and
economic problems were generated by over 200 years or so of Portuguese
colonization and then more recently from Indonesian colonization. These endemic
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and indigenous issues are assumed to be the cause of East Timor's current
difficulty if forming a stable democracy. The question is not asked whether one of
the causes of today's problems is that exogenous pressures to perform to a certain
democratic standard won't necessarily resonate with domestic preferences.
So I think the answer to the question whether invasion is ever justified on the
basis of the democratic entitlement clearly has to be that it is not - not simply
because democracy at the point of a gun simply flies in the face of classical liberal
ideals of persuasion rather than coercion, but because as a practical matter, external
introduction of democracy is less likely to stick than internal political formations.
So then, finally, the question of the fate of democracy promotion after Iraq has
three answers. First, I would hope that post-Iraq, there might be increased pressure
for reforms of international or multinational organizations. It strikes me that the
U.S. coalition of the willing, going into Iraq, has reinforced the ineffective nature
of international organizations and that there needs to be either a renewed attempt to
have multilateral action take place in a more effective way, either at the U.N. level
or within multinational organizations such as NATO.
Secondly, I would like to point out that democracy promotion, especially when
it has been coming from the U.S., and especially as it has come through the aegis
of Iraq, has tended to focus on the rhetoric of freedom and liberty. This has
overlooked some very important aspects of democracy promotion. Democracy is
just one of a whole raft of human fights in the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights, and democracy promotion that has been premised on the idea of
liberty and freedom has, of necessity, needed to focus on civil and political human
rights. There are other human rights, social, economic, and cultural rights, which
are crucial to the maintenance, to the very foundation of political and civil human
rights that underwrites democratic promotion. So my hope during the post-Iraq is
that there could be a reexamination of the core values of democracy. Less focus on
the formal trappings of democracy, elections, treaties, and agreements that talk
about formal rights, and much more focus on the substantive underpinnings of
what makes a society actually tip over toward a democratic society.
And finally, my question to the entire panel here is: just what sort of definition
of democracy ought to be talked about post-Iraq? Is there simply going to be one
version of democracy, the sort of democracy that Sharon referred to, which is the
preferred ideal of democracy, the sort of representative democracy with all the
institutions that we in the West tend to be familiar with? Or does there need to be
a re-assessment of different types of democracy, different types of selfdetermination that might just as equally fulfill the sorts of expectations of how we
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might want a society to run itself, so that citizens are able to rely on peace and
security and food and education? Is there a range of types of democracy that we
might want to be exploring that lie outside what we know so well, and which might
nevertheless be able to provide people with some of the basic fundamental human
rights?
Question from the Audience: The title of the panel is Democracy Promotion
After Iraq, and so from the different panelists I wasn't sure I could draw the thread
that I'm interested in, which is can you trace for your particular area, Russia for
instance or Latin America, has the U.S. experiment in Iraq had tangible results? Is
the state of democracy in Russia any worse off because of our mistakes in Iraq, or
is there really no relationship that we could persuasively draw. Are we going to be
in the same situation or not? And the same thing in Latin America if you can
answer it, or in other parts of the world.
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss: I can certainly take it in Russia. It has absolutely done a
tremendous amount of damage in the sense that we do not have the same sorts of
leverage that we had before and the same amount of respect. I mean the most
direct piece of evidence was President Bush's news conference with President
Putin about three months ago where Bush attempted to be somewhat critical of
Russia's democracy and President Putin seized that opportunity instantly and said
well we would not want to have democracy that looks like Iraq. The other thing
that it has done, of course, is make Russia much more powerful vis-A-vis Iran, and
its relationship with Iran has become even more important. The fact that Russia is
not a democracy, has not turned out to be the friend we thought it was and is now
increasingly an ally of Iran has done further damage to our position. Also just in
terms of funds available for democracy promotion, funds are not endless or
boundless. And certainly attention has not been focused on Russia, so this is
another very clear and direct effect, negative effects for sure.
Sharon Lean: I will just second some of what you were saying in terms of the
Latin American case. I mean certainly the debacle in Iraq has contributed to the
success of Hugo Chavez's anti-U.S. rhetoric in Venezuela, and sort of added fuel
to the fire and credibility. I cannot remember the cartoonist, but I recently clipped
a clever cartoon in which two Cubans are portrayed talking to one another about
how it looks like Fidel is finally near his end. The other Cuban says, now the U.S.
will be able to step in and really bring us democracy. And the first one says, like
in Iraq? And then the second one says, "Viva Castro!"
So there is a bit of a ripple there. The only difference I would say is that I think
the great funding gap is also true in the Latin American case. There are some
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particularly contentious cases in Latin America. It might be a good thing at the
moment that we do not have as much resources at our disposal to pour into the
situation in Venezuela, for example. Many Latin Americans will tell you that the
only reason we have not seen more forceful action, is that the forces are not
available. That is, I think, an overly pessimistic view of what the latitude of real
engagement might be.
Larry Diamond: The effects in the Middle East have been ambiguous. Early on
they had an inspiring effect. You can not deny that the example of Iraqis going to
the polls three times, defying great odds in terms of violence and terrorism, voting
in massive numbers, and in a very inspiring way, in January of 2005 had effects in
the region. And you can cite quotes of people saying, well if they can have it in
Iraq why can we not have it here? But as this has unfolded and the bottom has
fallen out of the security situation, people have seen that the effect has been intense
ethnic and sectarian polarization, and a deepening of the instability in the country.
I think it has actually strengthened the hands of autocrats in the region, who have
said you want democracy, you want unfettered competition, look next door at Iraq.
Is that what you want? And people have backed away from it, even democrats,
liberals, friends of ours in the region, have begun to back away from it in fear.
This has diverted our attention from settling the Palestinian/Israeli conflict,
where I think we are not going to get a breakthrough to democracy in the region
until we turn the corner on that. A real breakthrough. So on balance, I think it has
been quite negative, but there was a time when it appeared to have a certain
positive diffusing spillover arc to it.
Helen Stacy: It is an interesting question. I guess we have to wait and see what
ultimately the effect is going to be, but I am reminded of a talk the Chief
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo gave at
Stanford last week. 50 He made the point that when the U.S. initially did not sign
on to the International Criminal Court treaty,5 there was concern that this would
destabilize international support for the ICC. Last week he made the point that the
geopolitical record of the U.S. during this Administration, the fact that the U.S. is
not a party to the Treaty of Rome reflects much better on the ICC because who
would want to be in bed with the U.S. anyway.
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So who knows what is going to happen geopolitically. But what the Iraq
debacle might do is force the question of what are the elements of democracy that
need to be promoted, and what is democracy. Remember, the U.S. did not go into
Iraq to promote democracy. Hopefully Iraq may encourage reflection on the ex
post use of excuses of high principles for geopolitical or self-interest action. And
Iraq is having the effect of really causing a debate amongst the public in countries
that do not have anything like self determination, about precisely what sort of self
determination they ought to be pressuring their governments for or seeking
external help for.

